



India and Europe in the New world order : A study

Manisha.

Assistant professor in History department
Collage-Rajiv Gandhi Mahavidyalay Uchana

Abstract :

Up until recently, India was mostly overlooked on the international political and, more importantly, economic stage. But it seems that in the past decade India has begun to craft a bright new future for itself. The author delves at the ways in which India's rising economic prominence in Asia and globally are altering the country's sense of identity and, ultimately, its political standing. The possible impact of India's foreign policy and the measures it has employed on global politics, as well as the analysis of underlying interests and motivations that inform them. Both the United States and the European Union have Strategic Partnerships with India, which indicate that they see India as a global leader despite its historical prominence in the South.

Many people believe that China and India should claim the 21st century as their own. Indian foreign policy is undergoing a period of revision as a result of globalization's effects on the country and the end of the Cold War. India's worldwide influence has grown gradually during the 1990s, when economic liberalisation led to growth rates of 6-7 percent per year. India's progress is being shaped by two factors: the political dividend it has received as the biggest democracy in the world, and its rising economic status, which is expected to lead it to emerge, together with China, as a significant economic engine of the future. "The United States and the European Union (EU) both have a Strategic Partnership with India, and both support India's rise to global prominence as the South's undisputed leader. Since this is not a static situation, we must consider the political and economic ideals endorsed by the new emerging India in the framework of global governance (multilateralism, political and economic values and international security).

Keywords: World order, India, foreign policy identity

India's Perception of its Role in International Politics

India, unlike its neighbour Pakistan, does not consider itself a source of nuclear proliferation and sees itself as a responsible nuclear country. Its lengthy track record of democracy and its domestic war against terrorism have resonated with Europeans and Americans. India's new



foreign policy stance after 9/11 is seen in the country's prompt offer of overflight rights and bases to the United States. Given the tense bilateral relationship between India and the United States during the Cold War, this offer represented a major breakthrough.

Competition for regional and global leadership in Asia is fierce. China, India, and Japan are important players within the region, while the United States and Russia are major external powers. Furthermore, several governments from West Asia to the Asia-Pacific are developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and many more are sitting on large natural resource reserves.

Though it may raise eyebrows to say so, there is just as much reason to see the European Union as an emergent force as there is to view India. Like India, the European Union (EU) aspires to be more than just an economic superpower. Both are attempting to clarify their place in the evolving multipolar international order as the global power balance alters. Aspirations for both the European Union and India may be aided by tighter collaboration, but this raises the issue of how much. The EU and India have pledged to a strategic alliance, yet their current relationship has been compared to an unfulfilling arranged marriage. As both sides become preoccupied with issues closer to home, possibilities for tighter connections are diminishing.

Both India and the European Union have continental-scale economies and a baffling cultural, linguistic, and religious variety, all framed inside democratic and quasi-federal frameworks that continue in flux, which is something no other existing, developing, or aspiring great power has. However, despite the fact that they have a lot of promise as a couple, they haven't been able to fully realise it. Long on common foundations and abstract political aims, but short on details and deliverables, and lacking of timetables, is their Joint Action Plan, initially signed in 2005 and amended in 2008. Both the European Union and India have a hard time agreeing on a concrete shared agenda. In addition, both sides have basic flaws that hinder their global power goals and their ability to cooperate productively with one another.

Factors Influencing India's Foreign Policy

“The major objective of India's foreign policy has been to secure for itself strategic autonomy so that it can pursue its national interest. India's critical security concerns are:

- external security
- internal security
- sustained economic growth
- energy security



- maritime security
- access to technology”.

Due to the interconnected nature of the international and national levels of autonomy, an important issue for India is what form of international system will best serve the country's interests. Aspirational though it may be, India's ideal world would be one without polarisation and hegemony. This would allow for more independence for the country.

India's regional and international ties, as well as its domestic security, must be balanced against the backdrop of hegemony and globalisation. The United States is the preeminent military force in the world and the area because it is the only military hegemon and remains an economic superpower. Globalization, on the other hand, is leading to networked interdependence, notably in the economic realm, and the distribution of power, both of which fight against this centralization of authority. Due to this, the state is no longer the major player in the process, and this has an effect on the state's power to shape and steer the process. The principle of balance of power was important to India's upbringing, but it no longer holds true. It is clear that we live in an era of power and reliance, as shown by both global commerce and the global economy.

India has adopted a range of domestic and social strategies in addition to foreign policy considerations to solve its security issues. Regarding national and economic safety, the policy emphasis has been directed on economic modernization. You have to break down that 9% growth into its component parts to realise how the underperforming industries, notably agriculture, might cause a food security crisis and societal unrest. Only through inclusive growth, with heavy investment in health, education, and infrastructure that connects market demands to skill development in the youthful population, can India's demographics become an advantage. Focus is also being placed on de-fencing modernisation and upgrading of weapons systems, with an all-encompassing nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence and a 'No First Use' policy, to improve external security. As defence expenditure in Asia continues to rise, the issue of how it impacts political stability in Asia becomes ever more pressing. Enhancing regional stability and broadening India's outreach beyond South Asia into South-East Asia and Central Asia have both been priorities for the country's foreign policy establishment. Parallel to this trend are the deepening ties between the United States and the European Union. Policymakers in India are working to increase the country's hard and soft



power in order to assist it reach great power status and increase its strategic autonomy. However, the intellectual might of India becomes crucial when it comes to translating ideas into actionable intents promoting India's interests.

Implications for the World Order

When the world interacts with India, India interacts with the world. The relationship between India and the United States has changed the most dramatically. They have gone from being "estranged democracy" to "engaged democracies" after the end of the Cold War. For the first time in its bilateral connection with India, the United States is engaging it as entirely de-hyphenated from Pakistan because of the new dynamic in the interaction between the two countries. Second, it is trying to establish some kind of strategic partnership with India, which would be a positive vote of confidence in India's future role in the region and the globe. Third, the India-US Civil Nuclear Deal provides India with exemptions from the present nuclear framework, thus recognising India as a nuclear state. That is to say, the engagement with India has taken place on its own terms. The big question, however, is whether or not you can call this a "enduring alliance."

This is crucial because the United States and the European Union are interacting with China and India, two developing nations with very different political and economic approaches to development. Because it is the biggest non-Western country, India is both a source of strength and a close ideological partner to the West. Successfully combining pluralism and diversity with institutionalised democracy, India might serve as a role model for other countries.

The integration of the emerging nations is a major concern for the established order (the United States and Europe). Second, for India and other growing powers, the question of what they may do with their newfound influence and the sort of power and connections they want to achieve on the international stage. The issue of whether India is a follower of global standards or a challenger to alter the post-World War II status quo has been brought into focus by India's pursuit of nuclear power status and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Once again, we can see two separate problems. As a first question, do the world's growing powers (such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) desire to threaten the current order of things? The other option is that they seek to cooperate with the existing hegemon.

Some commentators have labelled the new India-US cooperation as "bandwagoning with the hegemon," but a closer look at India's foreign policy reveals a combination of balancing and



hedging of interests. When compared to the military superpower, the United States, India does not play the role of a security supplier, guarantee, or balancer. India would only participate as a security provider inside the United Nations system, which supports multilateralism as a foundation for global governance. Nonetheless, the existing institutions of global governance, whether in terms of players or norms, are a legacy of World War II and fail to account for the dynamic nature of the world's geopolitical landscape. Institutions of global governance reflect the unequal power structure among nations. This is why India is pushing for the formation of a new kind of multilateralism, maybe limited to the global South and include countries like Brazil and Africa. Because of the North-South divide in the trade and economic development agenda, India is looking to form a South-South alliance on these issues. Many people, both in India and outside its borders, see the country's efforts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as a pursuit of national interest (the desire for veto power). India, however, prefers to align itself with the P5 rather than join that group. Some people think of India as a hesitant hegemon who is loath to engage since doing so would be inconsistent with the global presence it wants to present.

India has not randomly sought out deeper connections to its regional neighbours or to other major foreign players in the area. Instead, and as could be expected, India is picking nations to invest in based on the unique security, political, and economic advantages they can provide. China's dynamic surroundings, including Macau, Hong Kong, and South Korea, are driving economic expansion and institutional reforms that will give the country a hand in shaping its own future. The absence of a vibrant neighbouring country, along with India's own bureaucratic rigidity, is a significant obstacle for the country.

Indian involvement on the international stage reflects the country's fundamental objective in promoting stability throughout the broadest possible geographic area. That's why New Delhi has joined in UN peacekeeping and other initiatives. India seeks a multilateral structure that is both rule-based and open to new players. Future global political and economic governance will be heavily influenced by India's political and economic interactions with the current great powers and developing powers. India's foreign policy focuses on areas outside of its immediate neighbourhood in order to protect its economic interests, particularly its need for access to raw resources and energy supplies, which may place it in direct rivalry with China in regions like Central Asia and Africa. When taken together, China and India pose a new threat to the



international community known as "Chindia." One can only speculate as to whether or not these two rising Asian countries would support the status quo of global governance or instead attempt to impose their own standards. Indian foreign policy as it is currently practised seeks to increase India's power and influence by, among other things, deepening bilateral ties with the United States, Europe/EU, China, and Russia, actively participating in regional and international organisations, and making effective use of India's soft power. The balance between its external and domestic security concerns is shown by its expanding collaboration with Israel, particularly in the military area, and by its ongoing contacts with the Arab world”.

There is mounting evidence that nations with developed civilisations, such as China and India, will be influential in future global politics. However, India's approach to security is still in the works. If India wants to become a big player on the international stage, it has to have a comprehensive security plan. There are a number of reasons why the international order of the future will be both polycentric and Asia-centric. Given the breadth of India's interests, it makes sense for the country to work toward making the Asia-centered century a more cooperative one. India has to portray itself as an assertive and progressive nation, one that is eager to assume a more active role in maintaining international peace and security.

Conclusion :

Even though the European Union (EU) and India have established a complex set of institutions to further their cooperation, the alliance they have forged is scarcely strategic in nature. Such a designation would be warranted only if it expanded beyond bilateral talks to include regional or international cooperation. So far, this has not occurred in any of the areas addressed in the declaration of strategic collaboration. Continued efforts to reinvigorate and elevate the relationship are met with scepticism and unfavourable framework circumstances from both parties, yet these efforts persist nevertheless. The alliance is in danger of stagnation and political marginalisation until the long-delayed Free Trade Agreement is finally finalised.

The obvious failure of the EU-India cooperation is indicative of deeper flaws on both sides, flaws which have an effect on the EU and India's respective stated and tacit aspirations to become a global power. As it is, the EU's deficit is primarily one of capabilities. Brussels has outlined a plan for the EU to play a leading role in global governance, but it lacks the authority



to fully commit Europe on most political and security issues. The European Unification (EU) must take significant steps toward political union at home if it is to evolve from its current position as a strong economic power to that of a global strategic role. It is now more accurately defined as a "partially submerged" power than a "emerging" one. Because of this skills gap, the EU's collaboration with India, and its other strategic alliances, will remain constrained.

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